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Social Protection Without Protectionism*
JoSePh e. Stiglitz
The various papers in this volume highlight different dimensions of the 
rise in insecurity. The increased threat of terrorism may have decreased 
our sense of physical security. With growing numbers of Americans not 
covered by health insurance, there is an increase in “health insecurity.” In 
addition, global warming confronts everyone around the world with an 
important new set of environmental risks. This chapter focuses on one key 
dimension of insecurity—economic insecurity.
In spite of the social and economic progress of society in recent decades, 
in many countries—both developed and developing—individuals have less 
economic security today than they did earlier. This is especially true in 
the United States. As the International Commission on the Measurement 
of Economic Performance and Social Progress observed, our measures of 
GDP do not adequately reflect this important aspect of well-being (Fitoussi, 
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Sen, and Stiglitz 2010). If they did, improvements in the standard of living 
would be less than current measures suggest.1
Today the world is immersed in a global financial crisis.2 The risks and 
uncertainties are unprecedented. No one is sure how this crisis will evolve. 
In the years after the Great Depression, we erected in the United States 
and many other advanced industrial countries a set of social protections. 
But in the United States and some other countries, the last three decades 
have seen these social protections weakened—in the name of increased 
economic efficiency.
The arguments for doing so, at least in some cases, were of dubious 
merit.3 For instance, the shift from defined benefits retirement programs to 
defined contributions has imposed more risk on individuals and, by weak-
ening the economy’s automatic stabilizers,4 increased economic volatility. 
As markets crashed in 2008 and 2009, many saw their life savings disappear 
before their eyes. Those who had looked forward to a comfortable retire-
ment now face unprecedented anxieties as they confront their old age.
Other changes have simultaneously decreased equity in our society 
and increased economic volatility. Social protection programs (relative to 
the size of the economy) have been scaled down, and the degree of progres-
sivity of the income tax system has been reduced.
The weakening of social protections has, from a macroeconomic per-
spective, both adverse demand and supply-side effects. Individuals who see 
their income and (retirement and housing) wealth erode will cut back on 
consumption—especially in the United States, where the average house-
hold savings rate has been near zero. The increased risk (associated not 
only with retirement but also with unemployment) is also likely to contrib-
ute to increased savings—especially in a country where the need for pre-
cautionary savings for medical and other emergencies is so great, especially 
if the safety valve of being able to borrow has been dampened down.
With strong anti-age discrimination laws in the United States, there is 
a further supply-side effect in labor markets: Many who otherwise would 
have retired may be forced to work longer. With the supply of labor in-
creasing and the demand for labor decreasing, unemployment (open and 
disguised) will increase.
This will, of course, put more downward pressure on wages, exacerbat-
ing the already increasing inequalities in American society.
As the effects of the financial crisis begin to be felt in the real economy, 
unemployment will increase.5 The official unemployment rate will under-
estimate the stress in the labor market—large numbers will drop out of 
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the labor force, others will take part-time jobs simply because no full-time 
jobs are available, and still others will claim disability benefits. The official 
unemployment rate is likely to hit 8% to 10%, the effective (“real”) rate will 
be at least 50% higher, and the unemployment rate in certain marginalized 
groups (youth, minorities) will be greater still.6
Unfortunately, in recent years, unemployment insurance has been cut 
back, to the point that less than forty percent of the unemployed receive 
benefits, and the replacement rate (the ratio of benefits to normal income) 
has fallen , to around a half (compared with three-quarters in some Euro-
pean countries).
Even before the crisis, those in manufacturing were facing problems. 
The pre-crisis excesses—a bloated financial sector garnering for itself 40 
percent of all corporate profits and a real estate sector absorbing forty per-
cent of all investment—will compound the challenges of restructuring the 
economy. Unless the hoped-for government stimulus package is well con-
structed,7 it will do little directly for those in manufacturing, real estate 
or even in finance: Those in the financial sector are not likely to retrain 
themselves to work on road construction crews.
Social changes, including the weakening of unions, have heightened 
these problems. Job protections are weaker and, in Europe, there is ongo-
ing pressure to weaken them further in the name of labor market flexibil-
ity. Enhancing the ability of individuals to move from one job to another 
has obvious efficiency benefits. However, imposing high costs on indi-
viduals by stripping away hard-won protections also has obvious costs—
a loss in security, which has received too little attention. The rhetoric 
of increased labor market flexibility is often just a code for lower wages 
and fewer job protections. The question (to which we turn later in this 
chapter) is, can we have more labor market mobility with greater secu-
rity? Although some countries may have struck the balance too much in 
favor of security, the United States may have gone too far in the opposite 
direction.
In many developing countries, matters are even more dire. The conse-
quences of weakeningjob protections are worsebecause economic volatility 
in these countries has been increased as a result of capital, financial, and 
trade liberalization (see the section “Globalization and Social Protection” 
later in this chapter).
In the face of these uncertainties, demands for protection are inevi-
table. So concerned were the G-20 leaders about such demands that one 
of the few commitments undertaken at their first meeting in Washington 
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in November of 2008, was a commitment to not resort to protectionism in 
response to the crisis.
This chapter argues that a need for enhanced social protection exists 
and that this social protection will not only decrease the demand for pro-
tectionism but also enhance the efficiency of the economy. This chapter 
then describes some innovative forms that this social protection might 
take. First, however, the theory of market failures on which the principle of 
social protection lies is explained, and how globalization may have made 
the problem of providing social protection more difficult is described.
the theory of market Failures
At least since Keynes, we have understood that markets are not self-
regulating, at least in the relevant time frame. The Great Depression led 
to new insights as to how periods of unemployment could persist. Today 
everyone (or almost everyone) is a Keynesian8—both the Left and Right 
agree that there is a role for government in maintaining the economy at 
full employment.
After the Great Depression, a peculiar doctrine prevailed called the 
neoclassical synthesis, which held that once the market failure of unem-
ployment was corrected, markets could be relied upon to allocate resources 
efficiently. It was not a theorem, but a simple belief—perhaps held so that 
all the investments in neoclassical economics would not be thrown by the 
wayside.9 The idea was always suspect, though. Why should market failures 
only occur in big doses? Recessions were more like the tip of the iceberg. 
There were many smaller market failures, harder to detect, lurking beneath 
the surface; many were related to imperfect information, incomplete mar-
kets, and irrational behavior. Indeed, a closer examination of behavior re-
vealed huge inefficiencies, for instance in the so-called tax paradoxes.10
The current crisis is a microeconomic failure leading to a macro-
economic problem. As we have noted, financial markets are supposed to 
allocate capital and to manage risk. But they misallocated capital and mis-
managed risk. Markets did not create financial products that would have 
enabled individuals to manage the risks which they face Individuals can-
not buy insurance against risks associated with their future wages or even 
against broader macroeconomic risks (such as GDP risks). Instead markets 
focused their attention on innovations that were, for the most part, perfect-
ing regulatory, accounting, and tax arbitrage. The “innovative” mortgage 
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products, while they succeeded in increasing the transactions costs re-
ceived by the financial sector, made it even more difficult for individuals to 
manage the risk of home ownership.11
Behind this market failure is a general theorem: Whenever information 
is imperfect or markets are incomplete (in other words, always), markets are 
not constrained Pareto efficient. That is, taking into account costs of collect-
ing and processing information or of creating markets, there are government 
interventions that can make everyone better-off (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1986).
Many of the important risks that individuals face are not insured (or 
insurable) by private markets. The burden of insecurity is placed on indi-
viduals. Without government, individuals would have no unemployment 
insurance. Private retirement programs do not insulate individuals against 
the risks of inflation; only the government social security program—and 
some defined benefit programs—do so. The mortgage products that were 
sold by financial markets forced many individuals to bear huge risks associ-
ated with interest rate volatility. Not only were products not provided that 
helped these individuals mitigate the risks they faced, but markets totally 
misjudged their ability to bear the risks associated with the financial prod-
ucts (such as mortgages) that they sold them.
Not only did the financial markets fail to provide the products which 
would have enabled ordinary citizens to better manage the risks they faced, 
the markets have even resisted innovations to improve risk-bearing. When 
I was a member of the Council of Economic Advisers, I pushed for the 
introduction of inflation-indexed bonds. We finally succeeded, despite the 
opposition of many from the financial markets. When Argentina proposed 
introducing GDP bonds as part of its debt restructuring, enabling better 
risk sharing (related to the uncertainties about how much debt the country 
could reasonably bear), financial markets resisted.
Insurance markets often fail, either as a result of moral hazard or of 
adverse selection. Nonmarket insurance (e.g., provided by social [non-
governmental] institutions) often make matters worse; they might exac-
erbate, for instance, the problems of moral hazard and crowd out market 
insurance with less effective “informal” insurance (Annott and Stiglitz 
1991). In this chapter, however, we are concerned primarily with publicly 
provided (social) insurance for risks such as unemployment, which private 
markets almost never provide.
One of the reasons that markets often do not provide such insurance is 
that these are systemic risks—with huge potential losses beyond the ability 
of any individual or firm to bear.12
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The failure of individuals to purchase insurance against some of these 
risks—when insurance is available—is a reflection of moral hazard; they 
know that in a modern society the government cannot allow individuals or 
society to suffer excessively from their failure to purchase insurance or to 
take appropriate actions to mitigate risk. The banks have been particularly 
guilty; there have been repeated bailouts, and the bailouts have been poorly 
designed, with the banks (and more particularly, the bankers, the share-
holders, and the bondholders) bearing few of the consequences of their bad 
lending decisions. In most of these cases, society could have been just as 
well or better protected without the financial sector investors having been 
bailed out, at least to the extent that they were.
Any provider of insurance needs to be sure that the insured-against 
event does not occur—or that it occurs with less frequency and severity. 
That is part of the rationale for regulation. (Not surprisingly, those like the 
banks, who are beneficiaries of this subsidized social insurance, not only 
call for more insurance, they also call for less regulation.)
At the same time, the fact that the government will step in if private 
parties fail to adequately self-insure provides a rationale for compulsory 
provision of social insurance (social security).
There are additional reasons for (publicly provided) social insurance: 
Transaction costs may be lower than for privately provided insurance (as in 
the case of the U.S. Social Security program). One reason transaction costs 
are lower is the lack of spending on unproductive advertising. Another is 
that private firms have an incentive to engage in cream skimming—in as-
certaining who the low-risk individuals are.
For a societal perspective, under a utilitarian or a Rawlsian social wel-
fare function (that is, a society which maximizes either the sum of the utili-
ties of individuals or the well-being of the worse off individual), optimal 
social insurance entails pooling—not discriminating among individuals 
with different risk categories. But pooling cannot be sustained within pri-
vate markets.13
Finally social insurance also may be an effective way (with limited 
costs) to engage in redistributive policies. Some redistribution occurs, for 
instance, through the U.S. Social Security program.
Effective social protection may have societal benefits not fully appro-
priated in private markets. Individuals who feel more secure are willing to 
engage in more risk-taking. In economies with progressive taxation, the 
government shares disproportionately in the upside of such risk-taking. By 
itself, this would discourage risk-taking; but with some downside protection 
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provided, the adverse effects are partially or possibly fully offset.In the New 
Economy, innovation and risk-taking have taken on special importance. 
Innovating individuals typically appropriate only a fraction of the social 
returns from their activities.
There is a final rationale for government intervention in markets, per-
haps particularly evident in the recent crisis. Markets behaved in a way 
that is hard to reconcile with rationality. In a sense, a failure of rationality 
by itself may not be a persuasive basis for government intervention, if the 
result was that individuals only harmed themselves. But others have been 
harmed—and governments have had to take action. The logicagainst gov-
ernment intervention, however, has been largely predicated on rationality, 
and the current episode provides convincing evidence of massive depar-
tures from rationality, with massive consequences.
For instance, markets used models that were flawed, and flawed in pre-
dictable ways. They underestimated systemic risk and obvious correlations. 
They ignored the fact that an increase in interest rates or that a decrease 
in aggregate demand would have adverse effects on housing prices across 
the nation; therefore, the risk of foreclosure would be correlated. And they 
repeatedly underestimated the significance of fat tail distributions. Events 
that their models claimed could happen only once in a century were hap-
pening once a decade—partly because of the aforementioned results, partly 
because markets underestimated other systemic effects. They systematical-
lyoverestimated the value of the insurance they had purchased (coverage 
from undercapitalized insurance companies was of less value than they 
thought), and they underestimated potential consequences of conflicts of 
interest and moral hazard problems, the perverse incentives to which the 
contracts they had gave rise, and the scope for fraud.14 Each of these and 
other problems had been discussed extensively beforebecoming evident in 
this crisis; most had manifested themselves in one way or another in ear-
lier crises.15 It had been noted, for instance, that stock options give rise to 
incentives for bad accounting. Especially when combined with the bonus 
incentive system, stock options gave rise to shortsighted behavior and to 
excessive risk-taking.16 Yet most market participants ignored the warnings.
Further, there was a kind of intellectual incoherence in many bankers’ 
analyses. They argued that they had created new products that transformed 
financial markets; their creativity helped justify their high compensation. 
Yet these bankers based risk assessments on data from before the creation 
of the new products—data that assumed the new risk products had not 
changed anything. This is particularly disturbing given that securitization 
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not surprisingly reduced the quality of lending (due to the newly intro-
duced asymmetries of information). So too, many in the financial sector 
argued that financial markets were efficient and based pricing on spanning 
theorems, which infer prices of, say, a new financial product from the prices 
of existing products. Yet they also argued that they were creating new prod-
ucts that transformed financial markets. If spanning theorems and efficient 
market hypotheses were approximately correct, then the maximum value 
of the new products was the savings in transaction costs. Yet expenditures 
on transaction services were actually increasing—with the financial sector 
eventually garnering for itself 40 percent of all corporate profits.
Other paradoxes are hard to reconcile with “rational markets.”17 For 
instance, even if those originating mortgages had flawed incentives, why 
didn’t investors buying mortgages exercise better oversight? If they were 
rational, they would have understood the obvious risks posed by securitiza-
tion. Why weren’t they more attentive to the perverse incentives provided 
by the peculiar incentive schemes?
What makes these behaviors so hard to explain is that these problems 
have been repeated. Evidently markets are slow to learn.
If only those individuals who engaged in these “irrational” behaviors 
suffered, then the rationale for government action might be debatable. In-
terventionists would be accused of paternalism. Shouldn’t individuals be 
allowed to make their own mistakes and to suffer the consequences?
There are two answers: The first is that these particular irrationalities 
have had systemic effects—and that these have occurred systematically. 
Others have had to bear the consequences. Governments cannot sit idly by 
when the well-being of the entire economy is at risk. In passing the $700 
billion Wall Street bailout, many congresspeople felt that they had a gun 
pointed at their head. Those who had mismanaged the economy were de-
manding ransom to save it! Legislators knew that this seemed wrong: They 
knew that taxpayers would not be happy—but they felt that the downside 
risk of not doing it was even greater.
The second answer is that individuals—and society more generally—
may realize that they (collectively) act irrationally, but know that such be-
havior cannot individually be stopped, at least without regulation. (Some of 
the instances of collective irrationality are not inconsistent with individual 
rationality. Some firm managers knew that paying out dividends unneces-
sarily increased tax payments, but they also knew that—given the beliefs of 
others—not to pay out dividends would result in a decrease in stock market 
values.) There may be an understanding that economies are plagued by 
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panics, booms, and busts; individuals suffer from herding, both rational 
and irrational. This knowledge by itself, however, is not enough. The behav-
iors that give rise to it have to be circumscribed. Individuals (in their mo-
ments of rationality) know this and, in effect, ask government to regulate 
these behaviors believing that they (individually and collectively) will be 
better off if the government takes appropriate actions.
Other aspects of financial markets are hard to explain. Markets still 
have not made available mortgages that would have helped individuals 
manage the risks that they face; there are obvious welfare-enhancing in-
novations. Such alternatives have been introduced elsewhere. The Danish 
mortgage bonds have a proven record of success. Given capital market im-
perfections, there are advantages of variable rate, fixed payment, and vari-
able maturity mortgages. In the past, government has often had to play an 
entrepreneurial role in improving risk and capital markets. Prior to govern-
ment provision of social security, annuity markets were virtually absent. 
Prior to government provision of mortgages, mortgage markets for most 
citizens were thin. It was government that pioneered the securitization of 
mortgages and the providing of student loans.
Today there is a host of lacunae in the private sector’s provision of risk 
mitigation products—some easy to understand (the classical problems of 
insurance market failure), some harder to explain. One of the reasons for 
social protection is to fill in these gaps.
globalization and Social Protection
Globalization has enhanced the need for social protection; unfortunately, 
it has also often been associated with a decrease in the provision of social 
protection.
Globalization, at least as it has typically been managed, has exposed 
countries to new risks. Economic and financial crises have become more 
frequent. Openness exposes countries to new sources of outside shocks.
Although in principle, one of the arguments for capital market liber-
alization was that it would enable stabilizing capital flows, for the most 
part, capital flows have been procyclical. As the old adage has it, bankers 
do not like to lend to people who need their money. When a country faces 
a downturn, those who have lent that country money demand it back. The 
evidence is that, at least for many countries, capital and financial market 
liberalization has been associated with increased volatility.
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Increased volatility imposes particularly heavy burdens on unskilled 
workers and small businesses. Even when countries respond quickly and 
effectively to the new shocks, the average unemployment rate increases. 
When job destruction resulting from trade liberalization is matched by job 
creation, the job losses are associated with significant wage decreases. But 
in many countries, job destruction has outpaced job creation, at least for 
significant periods.
Although globalization has imposed additional burdens for social pro-
tection, it has weakened government’s ability and willingness to provide 
such protections.
Many countries have argued, for instance, that the increased competi-
tion associated with globalization requires that they strip away social pro-
tections to make the economy more nimble and to help it adapt to changing 
circumstances. They have argued for more labor market flexibility. Global-
ization has implied changing comparative advantages, requiring redeploy-
ment of workers. Lack of labor market flexibility impedes that process. But 
globalization has meant that, in effect, unskilled workers in the advanced 
industrial countries have had to compete with comparable workers in de-
veloping countries—workers who are often paid a fraction of the wages 
received by those in advanced industrial countries. Not surprisingly, em-
ployers would like their workers to accept large wage cuts; this is what they 
often mean by increased labor market flexibility.
Because globalization has proceeded in a very asymmetric way, with 
financial and capital market liberalization outpacing labor market liberal-
ization, and markets for skilled labor being liberalized more rapidly than 
markets for unskilled labor, countries have faced increased competition for 
capital and, in some cases, for skilled labor.
This has had both direct and indirect consequences. It has reduced the 
bargaining power of labor versus capital and especially that of unskilled 
labor. Thus globalization has contributed to growing inequality within most 
countries of the world and to the weakening of social protections. Compe-
tition from abroad has lowered the ability of unions to deliver higher wages 
and better working conditions, and this has weakened unions. There has 
been a vicious circle, in which workers have been the losers.
Asymmetric globalization has also forced countries to lower taxes on 
capital and to reduce environmental and health protections on unskilled 
labor. Developing countries have been forced to cut back on tariffs, and 
they have not been able to make up for the shortfall in tax revenues in 
other ways. Although government revenues and the scope for progressive 
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taxation have been diminished, globalization has also put pressure on gov-
ernments to cut back deficits and to redirect spending toward increasing 
the attractiveness of private investment. All of this leads inextricably to the 
reduction of government expenditures on social protection.
The argument for globalization has typically been that it would so in-
crease growth that everyone would benefit—an updated version of trickle-
down economics. But trickle-down economics has not worked, at least in 
many countries, perhaps because the increases in inequality have been so 
large and the benefits in growth have been so small that the adverse effects 
of the former have outweighed the positive effects of the latter.
There is, indeed, an argument to the contrary: Unbridled globaliza-
tion has led to increasing inequality and insecurity. Increasing insecurity 
undermines, as we have noted, the willingness of individuals to undertake 
high-return risky activity, thereby lowering growth. But there is a further po-
litical economy effect: Growing inequality enhances the scope for distribu-
tive politics. Rather than a consensus around high-return public investments 
and social protections that enhance individuals’ ability to cope with the risks 
posed by globalization and, in turn, to increase their willingness to accept the 
challenges that it presents, politics becomes more divisive. Social justice may 
demand that more of government revenue go toward redistribution, which 
the rich resist—except when they benefit from the redistributions themselves 
(as in the massive bailouts). The rich, worried that a strong state might use its 
powers to redistribute, work to weaken the power of the state and its ability 
to perform even its productivity enhancing role. Especially in democracies 
like the United States where campaign contributions and lobbying can have 
a large influence on shaping political outcomes, the perspectives of the rich 
may come to predominate—or at least to have an influence far outweighing 
their share in the population. The new equilibrium that emerges may be a 
relatively smaller state, with less social protections and less productive public 
investments, in which most citizens are actually worse off.
designing Social Protection in an era of globalization
Countries have approached the problem of social protection differently. 
Among the advanced industrial countries, the United States is perhaps at 
one extreme, the Nordic countries at another. Some of the differences may 
reflect differences in behavior and social cohesion—the likelihood that in-
dividuals will take advantage of government-provided benefits.
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But even in a country as diverse as the United States, I believe that the 
current arrangements are Pareto inefficient; and that there is a risk that 
things may be getting still worse. I believe that we could provide more se-
curity and increase national output. Doing so requires changing macroeco-
nomic, regulatory, and social protection policies.
Social protection is designed to safeguard individuals from a variety of 
adverse circumstances—illness, disability, loss of work, and so on. Some of 
these adverse events are predictable, at least to some extent. As individuals 
get older, there is a higher risk that they will lose income from work, either 
from voluntary retirement, incapacity to work, or the loss of a job; employ-
ers are reluctant to hire someone over 70. Market investments in which 
individuals put their money are highly volatile. If they put their money in 
the stock market, it may lose value. If they put it into short-term Treasury 
bills, the yield may fall to zero. They may live longer than they expected, so 
the amount they set aside for retirement may not suffice. Inflation may erode 
the value of their retirement income. As we have noted, markets provide in-
adequate insurance against the risks that individuals face When markets do 
provide insurance, transaction costs may be unjustifiably high or restrictions 
may be imposed that make the insurance highly imperfect. Government has 
had to provide social protection simply because the market has failed.
Here I focus on one aspect of social protection—against unemploy-
ment and macroeconomic volatility—but much of what I have to say is 
equally applicable to other forms of social protection.
Macroeconomic Stability
The first and most important aspect of economic security is to maintain the 
economy at as close to full employment as possible and to protect individu-
als from what happens when governments fail to achieve that objective. 
(Full employment is also an important aspect of physical security: It has a 
strong effect on crime.) That, in turn, requires (a) moderating exposure to 
external and internal shocks; (b) ensuring that there are strong, built-in sta-
bilizers; (c) avoiding built-in destabilizers; (d) using effective discretionary 
policies to compensate for deficiencies in the effectiveness of the automatic 
and structural policies; (e) having in place active labor market policies to 
facilitate individuals moving from one job to another, in response to the 
necessary adjustments to the economy; and (f) protecting individuals who 
do lose their jobs and can’t provide full-time alternatives.
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As noted earlier, many of the so-called reforms in recent years have 
moved in exactly the wrong direction.
Of particular concern are monetary policies that focused on inflation, 
assuming that controlling inflation was necessary and almost sufficient for 
stability and growth. We now see how wrong that perspective is. As mon-
etary authorities pursued price stability, they supported deregulation and 
liberalization policies that increased the fragility of the financial system, the 
consequences of which we are now seeing. There was no excuse: We have 
seen these problems repeatedly.
An excessive focus on deficits and debt (reflected in Europe in the 
Growth and Stability Pact) constrains the use of discretionary fiscal policy 
when needed. Not only is this shortsighted from the short-term perspective 
of stability, it is also misguided from a growth perspective and from that 
of the country’s long-term national debt. What countries should focus on 
is their balance sheet; borrowing for high productivity assets improves the 
economy’s long-term prospects.
I described earlier how we have weakened some of the automatic 
stabilizers—those in the private and public sector and in tax and expendi-
ture policies. Automatic stabilizers providing social protection simultane-
ously reduce the need for social protection by ensuring that the economy 
is maintained closer to full employment and by helping individuals cope 
with the consequences of imperfect macroeconomic policies—the failure 
to maintain the economy at full employment. Not only, have some coun-
tries’ automatic stabilizers been weakened, we have put in place automatic 
destabilizers.
Regulatory Policies
Some of the reforms designed to enhance the strength of the financial 
system approached the problem from a microeconomic perspective—that 
of a single firm facing a problem—and ignored systemic effects. The result 
was procyclical automatic destabilizers. Rigid capital adequacy standards 
were imposed or rigid rules about loan-to-value ratios. The result was 
that when, say, a property bubble developed so that the nominal value of 
the assets soared, banks were allowed to lend more (in total and to each 
property), fueling the bubble.18 There is an alternative—macro-prudential 
regulation—where the capital adequacy and loan-to-value ratios are 
adjusted to reflect the state of the economy.
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Coping with Instability
Even the best-designed automatic stabilizers, regulatory policies, and dis-
cretionary interventions will be imperfect: There will still be some eco-
nomic volatility. This means that someone should fill the gap. Private 
markets have failed to provide insurance. Government has had to step in 
to fill the breach.
At least two reasons for private sector failure illustrate the broader is-
sues raised earlier. The first is that the size of the macroeconomic risk is too 
large: Unlike death (other than from war and plagues), unemployment is a 
highly correlated risk. When the economy goes into a deep and prolonged 
recession, such as the Great Recession of 2008, the requisite payments are 
simply too great for a private insurance company to bear.
The second reason is the problem of asymmetric information: In-
dividuals most likely to purchase insurance are also those most likely to 
see themselves unemployed. Those in secure positions would not buy the 
insurance.
Employers do provide severance pay, but it is typically limited and of 
minimal effectiveness. If the company provides severance pay if an indi-
vidual is fired, there will be an incentive to induce individuals to quit, by 
making the job unpleasant. If the employer provides too large a severance 
payment, the individual has little incentive to work; indeed, any severance 
pay increases the compensation that a firm has to pay to ensure that a 
worker does not shirk his duties (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984).
Almost all advanced industrial countries recognize that, for these and 
other reasons, one cannot rely on privately funded unemployment insur-
ance. But different countries have enacted legislation making it harder (or 
easier) to fire a worker and providing larger (or smaller) benefits, obtain-
able under more (or less) stringent terms. Many in Europe have proposed 
redesigning unemployment and job protection systems, and have called 
for more labor market flexibility, which their proponents emphasize will 
lead to more employment. These proponents might acknowledge that—
incidentally—this could lead to lower wages and to less security.
Such reforms have to be evaluated in terms of the impact that they have 
on societal welfare. Even if it were true that GDP as measured went up, that 
does not mean that such reforms are desirable; GDP takes no account of the 
value of security, and such reforms can markedly lower security. Nor does 
GDP take into account the impact on distribution: Pressing down already 
low wages may enhance GDP, but at what cost?
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Even in the more narrow terms of GDP and unemployment, however, 
these reforms may be counterproductive. The fallacy in the standard ar-
gument is easy to see. It is argued that individuals have to be motivated 
to search for a job. Unemployment benefits attenuate incentives to search. 
There may be some validity to that argument in normal times, when the 
unemployment rate is 4%. More intensive searching might enable us to 
lower the “frictional” unemployment rate. But today, with dozens of ap-
plicants for every job, adding one more individual to every queue will have 
a miniscule effect on employment levels. Lowering unemployment benefits 
to motivate searching will, on the other hand, have a significant detrimental 
effect on societal well-being.
More generally, policies aimed at reducing job projections may actu-
ally lead to higher levels of unemployment. In the Shapiro-Stiglitz “no-
shirking” incentive model of unemployment, what motivates individuals 
to work hard is the length of time that an individual is unemployed. 
That is a function of two variables: the size of the unemployment pool 
and the rate of flow into (and out of) that pool. Regulations that allow or 
that encourage easy firing of workers (when, for example, they are not 
perfectly matched with the needs of the firm) engender faster inflows 
(and in equilibrium, outflows) from the unemployment pool; therefore, 
in equilibrium, there will be higher wages and larger unemployment—
exactly the opposite of what was intended by enacting more labor market 
flexibility.19
Even with the best of macroeconomic policies, some individuals will 
lose their jobs and need to find new jobs. Active labor market policies di-
rected at helping individuals move from one job to another have shown 
that these policies can work—but obviously, only if there are jobs to which 
the jobless can move.20 Training workers for a labor market in which there 
are no jobs is not going to succeed.
explaining the changes
Recent years have seen marked changes in perspectives on social protec-
tion. Some of these changes were the result of misguided government in-
terventions to increase individual responsibility in the belief that markets 
work well on their own. Some of these changes were the result of misguided 
views on the extent of the problems of moral hazard (the adverse effects 
of providing any insurance). Conceptually it is possible that as individuals 
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get wealthier, they are in a better position to bear risk, or that as markets 
improve, there is less need to rely on social protections.
A closer look at what has happened provides an alternative, and less 
benign, interpretation of what has happened. Markets still do not provide 
retirees with adequate insurance against inflation. Markets still do a poor 
job of protecting against market volatility. No private insurance company 
can provide the kind of security that the U.S. Social Security program 
provides—and none can do it with anywhere near as low transaction costs.
Fine-tuning of government programs can fully take into account the 
balancing of risk mitigation and incentives—there is no need to abandon 
social protection.
Much of the drive for change is coming from a quarter that has no in-
terest in making the economic system work better—especially not for those 
who need social protection. Rather it is coming from those in the financial 
sector who see risk management as their domain of competency; and they 
see a takeover of activities in these sectors as a rich, new opportunity for 
enhanced fees (i.e., high transaction costs).
The demonstrated incompetency in financial sector risk management 
and the divergence between their private interests and broader social con-
cerns should give us cause for reflection: Some of the reforms in social 
protection undertaken in the last ten years may make sense, but some may 
reflect the success of the self-interested ideology that the financial sector so 
successfully foisted on much of the world.
Globalization and Changes in Social Protection
Globalization makes the challenge of maintaining economic stability 
greater—greater potential volatility, greater restraints in responding—but 
it also requires redesigning social protection and, in particular, shifting the 
locus of social protection away from corporations to society. The system 
of social protection that prevailed in the Soviet Union and in the United 
States—where corporations were responsible not only for production but 
also for providing welfare services—is no longer viable. It never made a great 
deal of sense. Institutions should have focus, and this focus should be on their 
comparative advantage. This increases productivity and allows more efficient 
sorting (that is, ensuring that good firms survive and bad firms fail). Today 
we may not be sure whether U.S. automobile companies are failing because 
they are inefficient or because they have a legacy of social burdens.
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The implication is that the social protection role of government is even 
more important today than it was in the past. An example of this changed 
role is provided by Denmark’s system of “flexicurity.”
Such reforms are particularly important in the context of U.S. pro-
vision of health care. The United States has been pursuing more modest 
reforms within the current structure,such as facilitating mobility by forbid-
ding provisions that deny coverage for preexisting conditions or reducing 
vesting requirements in retirement programs and moving toward individ-
ual accounts.
Some of these are moves in the right direction; some (like the indi-
vidual accounts) have weakened social protections, and are likely never to 
work very well. In particular, individual accounts are likely to be marked 
by high transaction costs and, simultaneously, to provide ineffective social 
protections (no pooling equilibrium) and to weaken built-in stabilizers.
Improving the Efficiency of Social Protections
The greater competition provided by globalization means, of course, that 
we have to enhance efficiency in the provision of economic security. One 
important reform entails integrating social insurance programs (as Singa-
pore did with its Central Provident Fund). This can lead to better security 
with higher-powered incentives (Stiglitz and Yun 2005). For instance, most 
episodes of unemployment are short-lived. If capital markets worked better, 
individuals could self-insure. Allowing individuals to borrow against their 
pension funds allows for intertemporal smoothing—but then one needs to 
provide lifetime insurance against the risk of a series of bad outcomes, such 
as extended unemployment (Stiglitz and Yun 2010b). It should be clear that 
we have not paid enough attention to the designof social protection systems 
that reduce the scope for moral hazard and simultaneously allow for greater 
smoothing of consumption over time and across states of nature.
A Catalytic Role for Government
Social protection is designed to help mitigate the consequences of the risks 
that individuals face in a market economy. We noted earlier that it is strik-
ing how poorly markets have fared in providing risk mitigation products. 
Earlier I described pervasive market failures in the provision of market 
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insurance. The crisis has brought out the fact that some—perhaps many—of 
the U.S. financial market’s innovations in recent years actually exacerbated 
the real risks that borrowers faced and exploited borrower ignorance. This 
should not come as a surprise: The misalignment between private incen-
tives and social returns that led markets to perform so poorly in allocating 
capital and in managing risk also implied that they had distorted incentives 
with respect to innovation.
In a sense, though, incentives in innovation are more distorted because 
of the difficulty of appropriating returns from financial products that actu-
ally might succeed in mitigating risks faced by individuals. A good product 
would simply be imitated, and the innovator would not be able to capture 
much of the returns.
As a result, the government needs to take a role not only in regulating 
financial markets (e.g., restricting the kinds of mortgages that they can offer) 
but also in developing new risk mitigation products. For instance, I have re-
peatedly made reference to the need for better mortgages. Even with more 
extensive social security, there is a need for better retirement insurance. The 
private sector continues to fail to provide protection against inflation and 
protection against changes in relative position. If wages and productivity in-
crease rapidly, a worker who retires at 65 and relies on savings from his own 
wages is likely to find his level of consumption much lower than that of the 
rest of society by the time he is, say, 85. Some protection against both of these 
risks is, of course, included in the current social security program.
More broadly, defined benefit retirement programs have provided pro-
tection against risks that cannot be insured in the market. Individuals with 
defined contribution programs are thus left exposed. If the market cannot or 
does not provide insurance against these risks, then the government should.
Today many defined benefit programs are in serious economic straits. 
They put aside money based on beliefs concerning “normal” returns and 
were allowed to take out some “excess returns.” Now, with the deep drop in 
the markets, they are underfunded. There is a need for government reinsur-
ance for defined benefit programs and for better regulation to ensure that 
they are adequately funded.21
(Of course, with publicly provided insurance, the government must do 
what it can to reduce the risk of the insured against events occurring; in the 
case of the financial sector, this entails better, and stronger, regulation and 
better macroeconomic management.)
We should be broadening social protections and enhancing the ability 
of individuals and families to manage the risks that they face by themselves. 
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Better educated people are better able to adjust to the shocks they face. 
They are more mobile and more adaptable. Families with two wage-earners 
have a built-in shock absorber. Thus family and education policies can be 
viewed, in part, as part of social protection policies.
Such policies can help address a variety of market failures (such as 
capital market imperfections) and may, at the same time, have positive 
supply-side and welfare effects. These policies increase individual expected 
utility and societal well-being (however that term is defined, whether in the 
utilitarian or in the Rawlsian sense).
concluding comments
I want to draw attention to one further aspect of strengthened social pro-
tection: Increased social protection may enhance political support for 
globalization.
Many forces contribute to the growing inequality and decreased social 
mobility. Globalization is only one of them. But it is one about which in-
dividuals think that they can do something. (They can’t do anything about 
changes in technology that alter the relative returns to, say, skilled versus 
unskilled labor.) Social protections—including adjustment assistance—
may make globalization more acceptable.
The old criticism of the welfare state was that it resulted in attenu-
ated incentives. It was based on the presumption that markets by them-
selves were efficient. The Great Depression undermined that belief, but it 
was almost resurrected through Keynesian economics and the neoclassical 
synthesis. Limited government intervention—limited to maintaining the 
economy at full employment—was all that was required to ensure economic 
efficiency. The theoretical foundations for this belief in the efficiency of 
markets—in this more limited sense—were undermined a quarter-century 
ago. Nonetheless, advocates of market fundamentalism continued with 
their crusade. Today no one can believe that unfettered markets lead to 
efficiency or stability.
Of course, ordinary citizens have long understood market failures. 
They knew that markets did not provide them with insurance against the 
important risks that they faced. But market fundamentalists argued that 
interventions in the market to provide insurance were distortionary—or 
even worse, interventions to require insurance were paternalistic. We have 
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argued that with the irrationalities in the market that have been so evident 
recently (and so evident repeatedly), citizens may well (and in some sense 
rationally) desire some degree of paternalism. Moreover, the large external 
effects generated by the failure to provide and obtain appropriate risk pro-
tections necessitate collective action.
Globalization and the current economic crisis require that we revisit 
our system of social protections. There is room for improvement in most 
countries, but especially in the United States. Appropriately designed so-
cial protections cannot only enhance individual and societal well-being as 
broadly defined, but may even lead to an increase in output and growth.
As the United States and the world confront an economic downturn, we 
must be mindful of the anxieties of those who will not quickly find jobs. For 
the United States, this means providing health insurance (perhaps through 
the Medicare system) for the unemployed and assistance to avoid foreclosures 
(such as the UK does)22. It should be clear that the market has failed to provide 
insurance against many of the risks that loom most importantly in individuals’ 
lives and that the government so far has not stepped into the breach.
In the run-up to the crisis, the private sector—and some government 
regulators—demonstrated enormous hubris in their assertions about their 
(and the markets’) ability to manage risk. But advances in economics do 
mean that we understand the issues far better than we did, say, forty years 
ago. We have a deeper grasp of moral hazard and adverse selection and of 
the consequences of incomplete and asymmetric information and imper-
fect and incomplete risk markets. I believe we can use this knowledge in a 
way that can generate more security—with less adverse incentive effects—
than has been the case in the past.
The Great Recession has reminded millions around the world of the 
frailty of their prosperity. Life prospects can change dramatically with the 
loss of a job. The confidence of the young that they can then quickly get a 
new job after being let go has been shattered. Security is important—very 
important—for most ordinary citizens. The response of these millions to 
this new insecurity will be either to reduce the threats to their security—
through protectionism—or to improve the system of social protections. In 
short, the response to globalization should be to strengthen and to improve 
systems of social protection, not to strip them away.
The future dynamism and openness of the advanced industrial coun-
tries will depend on which of these choices they make. I hope it is along the 
path toward more social protection without protectionism.
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notes
1. While this chapter was written shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and 
the beginning of the global financial crisis, as this book goes to press, four years later, 
the global economy is still weak and future prospects uncertain.
2. Actually, in the United States, even in the conventional measure, most individu-
als have not been doing well. Median household income in the United States in 2011 was 
nearly 9% lower than it was in 1999 (U.S. Census Bureau).
3. The argument for weakening social protections paralleled the argument for 
stripping away regulations. In both cases, it was contended that there would be over-
whelming efficiency gains—gains so large that all would benefit. Deregulation of fi-
nancial markets may have led to increased short-term profits for that sector, but there 
is little evidence that there was any relationship between those short-term profits and 
long-term increases in societal productivity and the well-being of most citizens. Al-
though a small fraction of the financial sector was devoted to financing new innovations 
(in particular, venture capital firms), most of the so-called innovation was directed at 
regulatory, accounting, and tax arbitrage. The theory was that deregulation would lead 
to greater efficiency in the financial sector—to an enhanced ability to manage risk and 
to allocate capital. But the new innovations increased risk. Capital was misallocated on 
a massive scale. The sectors’ net private returns over a half-decade now appear to be 
negative—its social returns massively so.
4. Automatic stabilizers inject money into the economy when it is weak.
5. This chapter was written shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when 
the unemployment rate was only 6.9% (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). The predic-
tions of what would follow from that collapse turned out to be correct: Subsequently, 
unemployment increased to 10%, with one out of six Americans who wanted full-time 
jobs not being able to get them. As this revision goes to press, the unemployment rate 
is still stuck at 7.8%.
6. Even though the overall unemployment rate reached its peak at 10.6% in Janu-
ary 2010, the youth (ages 16–19) unemployment rate soared to 26.9%, and the African 
American unemployment rate was 17.3%.
7. A stimulus package of almost $800 billion was enacted in February 2009. It was 
less effective than it should have been; almost 40% of the package was tax cuts. Little of 
it was directed at restructuring the economy.
8. This moment of universal Keynesian was short-lived. As this book goes to press, 
countries around the world are engaged in cutbacks in expenditures and are worried 
about the large deficits that accompanied the global slowdown.
9. The idea is usually attributed to Paul Samuelson. For an early critique of this 
idea, see Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987).
10. See, in particular, the dividend tax paradox: Firms can reduce the total cor-
porate plus individual income taxes paid by repurchasing shares rather than paying 
dividends (Stiglitz 1973).
11. For a fuller analysis of the causes of the crisis, see Stiglitz (2010).
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12. This does not provide a full explanation because all that it takes to make a 
market is differences in views and/or differences in aversion/ability to bear these risks. 
I have discussed these issues more broadly in Stiglitz (1993).
13. For an analysis of optimal insurance in the presence of adverse selection and 
moral hazard and an explanation for the role of government, see Stiglitz and Yun 
(2010a).
14. Among the conflicts of interest were appraisers owned by originating compa-
nies and rating agencies paid by those producing products.
15. For instance, in the East Asia crisis, some of the cover for foreign exchange risk 
that Korean firms thought they had disappeared with the bankruptcy of the firm provid-
ing that cover. Many banks thought they have obtained insurance against some of the 
risks they faced by buying insurance through AIG (e.g. in the form of CDS’s), though 
AIG was clearly over-exposed. (In the end, the banks got “insurance” through the gov-
ernment; there is some suspicion that at least some of the banks may have counted 
on this.) Securitization gave rise to new asymmetries of information. Almost twenty 
years ago, at the beginning of the securitization movement, I suggested that it would 
end badly: “…the banks have demonstrated an ignorance of two very basic aspects of 
risk: (a) The importance of correlation…(b) The possibility of price declines” (Stiglitz 
1992:25).
16. In fact, in Stiglitz (2003), I attributed some of the problems of the previous 
economic downturn to excesses and to distortions created by such incentive schemes.
17. Even earlier, I had called attention to a large number of other such paradoxes—
behavior that was hard to reconcile with profit maximization or with value maximi-
zation. In particular, firms paid more taxes than they needed to (the so-called tax 
paradoxes and, in particular, the dividend paradox). There are also compensation 
paradoxes—ways of providing higher power incentives, with lower taxes and less risk 
(Stiglitz 1982).
18. The U.S. regulatory authorities behaved in an even worse way: As the bubble 
developed, they increased the allowable loan-to-value ratios and lowered the capital 
adequacy standards.
19. These results are robust( SeeRey and Stiglitz (1996) .) The more general point is 
that free market solutions, by themselves, are not constrained Pareto efficient (Stiglitz 
1974; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Arnott and Stiglitz 1985; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986, 
1988).
20. Again we can ask: Why is government necessary to provide such programs? 
There are two reasons. First, once individuals are out of a job, they typically face 
severe financial constraints, which make it difficult for them to finance these train-
ing programs. But perhaps more relevant, in many countries (including the United 
States), for-profit skills-training programs have a disproportionately large number of 
firms that are scams providing little in benefits. They excel not in education, but in 
deception.
21. As part of the defined benefits (deferred compensation) provided by firms, there 
is insurance against certain risks. As in other areas of insurance, the government has 
to make sure that there is adequate funding so that the promises made will be fulfilled.
stig15686_Book.indb   45 11/29/12   4:16 PM
46  S o c i a l  P r o t e c t i o n  W i t h o u t  P r o t e c t i o n i S m
22. One of the signal achievements of the Obama Administration was the passage 
of legislation ensuring access to health care for all Americans. It did not, however, build 
in the Medicare system, but rather was designed as a “patchwork” on the existing health 
care system, marked by high costs associated with private health care providers.
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